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Abstract
There has recently been a good deal of controversy about Lan-
dauer’s Principle, which is often stated as follows: The erasure of
one bit of information in a computational device is necessarily accom-
panied by a generation of kT ln 2 heat. This is often generalised to
the claim that any logically irreversible operation cannot be imple-
mented in a thermodynamically reversible way. John Norton (2005)
and Owen Maroney (2005) both argue that Landauer’s Principle has
not been shown to hold in general, and Maroney offers a method that
he claims instantiates the operation Reset in a thermodynamically
reversible way.
In this paper we defend the qualitative form of Landauer’s Princi-
ple, and clarify its quantitative consequences (assuming the second law
of thermodynamics). We analyse in detail what it means for a phys-
ical system to implement a logical transformation L, and we make
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this precise by defining the notion of an L-machine. Then we show
that logical irreversibility of L implies thermodynamic irreversibility
of every corresponding L-machine. We do this in two ways. First,
by assuming the phenomenological validity of the Kelvin statement of
the second law, and second, by using information-theoretic reasoning.
We illustrate our results with the example of the logical transforma-
tion ’Reset’, and thereby recover the quantitative form of Landauer’s
Principle.
1 Introduction
Computation can be theoretically described as a formal process of data ma-
nipulation when the only concern is with its logical form. However, any
computation that is actually carried out is realised by some kind of physical
process, and as such is subject to physical laws and the laws of thermodynam-
ics in particular. It is therefore important to consider what connections there
might be between the logical properties of computations and the thermody-
namical properties of systems that realise them. The last few decades have
witnessed a good deal of controversy about this matter following the seminal
work of Rolf Landauer (1961). His main conclusion, which has subsequently
become known as Landauer’s Principle, is that the erasure of information
in some computational device is necessarily accompanied by an appropriate
increase in the thermodynamic entropy of the device and/or its environment.
This result is often generalised as follows: (a) any logically irreversible process
must result in an entropy increase in the non-information bearing degrees of
freedom of the information-processing system or its environment; (b) any log-
ically reversible process can be implemented thermodynamically reversibly
(see for example Charles Bennett 2003). These two statements are believed
to provide the sought after link between thermodynamics and computation.
Recently however Landauer’s Principle has been contested and today, some
time after Landauer’s paper, the implications of Landauer’s arguments for
2
the general connection between logic and thermodynamics is the subject of
much debate. In particular, John Norton (2005) and Owen Maroney (2005)
both argue that Landauer’s Principle has not been shown to hold in general
1, and Maroney offers a method that he claims instantiates the operation
Reset in a thermodynamically reversible way.
In this paper we defend Landauer’s Principle. However, we emphasise
that we do not regard it as more fundamental than the second law of ther-
modynamics, and so we do not follow those authors who try to show that
Landauer’s Principle implies the impossibility of a Maxwell Demon. Rather,
we assume the second law and show that Landauer’s Principle follows. Hence,
we follow the ’sound’ rather than the ’profound’ horn of the dilemma that
John Earman and Norton (1998 and 1999) identified.
We believe that part of the reason for the above controversy is the fact
that many important notions in this domain are loosely defined and not prop-
erly understood. We begin by constructing a clearly defined set of concepts
for the conduct of reasoning about these issues, and we go on to establish
the connection between logical and thermodynamic irreversibility via a gen-
eral argument for a generalisation of Landauer’s Principle. In particular, we
will offer precise definitions of logical irreversibility and thermodynamic ir-
reversibility, before analysing in detail what it means for a physical system
to implement a logical transformation and thereby arriving at the notion of
an L-machine. This is a hybrid physical-logical entity that combines a phys-
ical device, a specification of which physical states of that device correspond
to various logical states, and an evolution of that device which corresponds
to the logical transformation L. Then we address the question of whether
the logical irreversibility of L implies thermodynamic irreversibility of every
1We agree with Norton (2005), p. 384, that Shizume (1995) and Piechocinska (2000) do
not provide general proofs of Landauer’s Principle, but deal only with particular physical
models of memory devices. We note also that they state Landauer’s principle in terms of
erasure, rather than in the full generality we consider, and they refer to ’heat generation’
and ’energy dissipation’ rather than thermodynamic irreversibility.
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Possibilities
Thermodynamically
reversible
Thermodynamically
irreversible
Logically
reversible
X X
Logically
irreversible
? X
Table 1: A table representing the different possibilities for logical and thermodynamic
reversibility. Our paper addresses the issue of whether any logically irreversible transfor-
mation can be implemented thermodynamically reversibly.
corresponding L-machine, and show that the answer is positive. This is our
restatement and generalisation of Landauer’s Principle.
Summarising the current state of the debate, we take it that everyone
agrees that there are both logically reversible and irreversible transforma-
tions, and that every logically reversible transformation is implementable in
a thermodynamically reversible way, and that any such transformation can
also be implemented in a thermodynamically irreversible way. Everyone also
agrees that a logically irreversible transformation can be implemented in a
thermodynamically irreversible way. So the issue is whether there are any
logically irreversible transformations that can be implemented in a thermo-
dynamically reversible way (as illustrated in table 1). The conclusion of our
present paper is that this is impossible. Thus we establish a complete link
between logical and thermodynamic irreversibility.
Throughout what follows we respect a clear demarcation between the
logical and physical domains, and hence we avoid talk of logical ’processes’
and refer instead to logical transformations and their implementation by
families of physical processes. When we use the term ’process’ we always
refer to a physical process in which a system starts in some particular state
and is guaranteed to end in some particular state2. Note also that we do not
2In general, the particular end state may be a probabilistic mixture of thermodynamic
states, but usually we consider the case where the final state is not such a mixture. Al-
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state Landauer’s Principle in terms of ’erasure’ or ’energy/heat dissipation’.
We only address Landauer’s Principle as we have restated it, in the general
and precise form introduced above: If L is logically irreversible, then every
L-machine is thermodynamically irreversible3.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we ex-
plain what we understand by logical and thermodynamic irreversibility re-
spectively, and emphasise the importance of clearly distinguishing between
logical and physical concepts, and between individual processes and families
of processes. In section 4, we introduce the notion of an L-machine. In
section 5, in order to make connection with concrete observable phenomena,
we demonstrate that violation of Landauer’s Principle leads to violation of
the phenomenological validity of the Kelvin statement of the second law. In
section 6, we illustrate our results with the example of the logical transfor-
mation ’Reset’. In section 7, we clear up some confusions associated with
the notions of known and unknown data. In section 8, we offer a general and
precise argument for Landauer’s Principle using information-theoretic rea-
soning. Finally, in section 9, we consider an individual process which reveals
the irreversibility of an L-machine. In Appendix A we prove a result about
bounds stated in section 5, and in Appendix B we give a justification for
formulating the second law in terms of information theoretic entropies.
2 Logical irreversibility
First we note that a logical transformation is a mathematical operation, con-
sisting of a single-valued map L from a finite set X of input states, into a
finite set Y of output states (i.e. each input state is mapped by L to a unique
though, in the former case, the system may be supposed to actually be in some specific
component of the mixture, it is not guaranteed to end up in that component, and so this
component state cannot be considered as the final state of the process.
3An L-machine is just the most general way of capturing the idea of physically imple-
menting a logical transformation L.
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output state). For example, consider the case of binary-valued logic, in which
the input and output states are bit-strings (with 0 and 1 usually representing
‘false’ and ‘true’ respectively); the mapping L can be represented by a truth
table, or as a digital circuit constructed from some set of universal gates
(e.g. NAND and COPY). We say that a logical transformation is logically
reversible if and only if L : X → Y is a one-to-one (injective) mapping4.
Hence with a reversible logical transformation, we can uniquely reconstruct
the input state from the output state. If L is not a one-to-one mapping, we
say that it is logically irreversible.
It is crucial for our argument that we make a distinction between a log-
ical transformation, which is a map from a set of logical states to a set of
logical states, and a physical process, which is a change in a physical sys-
tem whereby it goes from a particular physical state to a particular physical
state. It follows that it makes no sense to talk of the implementation of a
logical transformation by a physical process, rather in so far as logical trans-
formations are implemented using physical systems, they are implemented
by a family of processes. For the physical system to implement the logical
transformation reliably, the family of processes must take each of the physi-
cal states that represent the logical input states to the appropriate physical
state, that is the one that represents the right logical output state (Our point
here is clearly illustrated in the case of a truth table, where each member of
the family of processes corresponds to a single row). We address the notion
of implementation of a logical transformation by a physical device in detail
in section 4 below.
4Note that whether or not L is surjective is irrelevant to our result. This is because if
there are output states that do not get arrived at by the implementation of the transfor-
mation these are irrelevant to our thermodynamic considerations.
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3 Thermodynamic irreversibility
Thermodynamic irreversibility, on the other hand is a feature of physical
processes, described by the second law of thermodynamics. There is much
controversy about the correct formulation of the latter, and about how it can
be justified on the basis of statistical mechanics. We will not address these
issues, but rather we will assume that the second law is valid.
In thermodynamics various operational assumptions are made that allow
the definition of the entropy of individual thermodynamic states (up to a
constant)5. There is much controversy about how the thermodynamic en-
tropy can be related to other quantities also called entropies such as the
Gibbs entropy, the Boltzman entropy, and the information-theoretic entropy.
In our main proof in Section 5, we make no assumptions about the relation-
ship between phenomenological thermodynamics and statistical mechanics,
and refer throughout to the thermodynamic entropy. In Section 8 we explic-
itly state that we are using the information theoretic definition of entropy,
and use it to offer an alternative proof of Landauer’s Principle. In general
all references to entropy should be taken as referring to the thermodynamic
entropy unless otherwise stated.
Consider a system in a heat reservoir at temperature T undergoing some
thermodynamic process p. If ∆Ssys(p) is the change in the entropy of the
system during the process p, and ∆Q(p) is the heat flow from the system
into the reservoir during the same process, then the second law requires that
∀ p, ∆Ssys(p) +
∆Q(p)
T
≥ 0 (1)
Identifying ∆Sres(p) = ∆Q(p)/T as the entropy change of the heat reser-
voir, we define
∆Stot(p) = ∆Ssys(p) + ∆Sres(p) (2)
as the total entropy change of the system and reservoir together. The second
5See, for example, Fermi (1936), Chapter IV.
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law can then be restated in the familiar form
∀p, ∆Stot(p) ≥ 0 (3)
i.e. total entropy is non-decreasing over time.
A process p is thermodynamically reversible if and only if ∆Stot(p) = 0.
If ∆Stot(p) > 0, the physical process p cannot be run in reverse, as the re-
verse process p′ would have ∆Stot(p
′) < 0, and hence violate the second law.
We therefore refer to any process p for which ∆Stot(p) > 0 as thermodynami-
cally irreversible. As is well known, there are a number of formulations of the
second law that are provably equivalent to this, modulo certain assumptions.
We will say that a family of physical processes is thermodynamically
irreversible if and only if at least one of its members is. This is important
for the definition of irreversibility for L-machines in the next section. We
raise this issue here since we now discuss the thermodynamics of a physical
process.
4 Implementing a logical transformation with
a physical device
In order to analyze the connection between logical transformations, and phys-
ical thermodynamic processes, we must consider what it means for a physical
system to implement a logical transformation. As we said above, a physi-
cal system can only implement a logical transformation through a family of
processes. To physically implement a logical transformation, we require: A
physical device, a specification of which physical states of that device corre-
spond to the possible logical states (we call the former representative states),
and a time evolution operator of that device. We refer to this combined sys-
tem as an L-machine. Note that L names a particular logical transformation,
so we have LAND-machines, and so on.
The time evolution operator must generate the relevant family of pro-
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cesses, and the reliability of the implementation consists in the time evolu-
tion operator being such as to ensure that whichever of the representative
physical states the device is prepared in, it ends up in the appropriate rep-
resentative state. This insistence on generality is an important difference
between our approach and that of Maroney (2005) who considers only indi-
vidual processes.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the time evolution operator
must encode everything about the behaviour of the device, and we therefore
rule out the possibility of an external agent intervening during its opera-
tion. In particular this prohibits any such external agent affecting the time
evolution of the system by making use of information about its state while
it is running. In other words, intelligent agents (such as demons) may be
introduced only if their knowledge and actions affecting the operation of the
device are included in the specification of the L-machine and its time evolu-
tion. Heuristically, we suppose that the interaction between the L-machine
and the rest of the world is limited to the setting of the input state and the
pressing of the ’go’ button.
Formally, we define an L-machine as an ordered set
{D, {Din(x)|x ∈ X} , {Dout(y)|y ∈ Y } ,ΛL} (4)
consisting of
• A physical device D, situated in a heat bath at temperature T .
• A set {Din(x)|x ∈ X} of macroscopic input states of the device, which
are distinct thermodynamic states of the system (i.e. no microstate is
a component of more than one thermodynamic state). Din(x) is the
representative physical state of the logical input state x.
• A set {Dout(y)|y ∈ Y } of distinct thermodynamic output states of the
device. Dout(y) is the representative physical state of the logical output
state y. Note that the set of input states and output states may overlap.
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x
L
−−−→ y∥∥∥ ∥∥∥
Din(x) −−−→
ΛL
Dout(y)
Figure 1: An illustration of the relationship between the logical states x and
y and their representative physical states Din(x) and Dout(y), showing the
logical transformation L and the physical time evolution operator ΛL.
• A time-evolution operator ΛL for the device, such that
∀x ∈ X,ΛL(Din(x)) = Dout(L(x)). (5)
An L-machine {D, {Din(x)|x ∈ X}, {Dout(y)|y ∈ Y },ΛL} physically im-
plements L in the following sense. If D is prepared in the input state Din(x)
corresponding to the logical input state x ∈ X, and is then evolved using ΛL,
it will be left in the output state Dout(y) corresponding to the logical output
state y = L(x) ∈ Y . We will denote this physical process by px.
Note that the labelling of the states is essential to the identity of a L-
machine. For example, exactly the same device and time-evolution operator
could be used as part of both an LAND-machine, and an LOR-machine by the
appropriate relabelling of the physical input and output states.
Consider the thermodynamics of the process px. If the entropy of the
system in the state Din(x) is Sin(x), the entropy of the system in state
Dout(L(x)) is Sout(L(x)), and the heat flow from the system into the reser-
voir during the process is ∆Q(px) = T∆Sres(px), the total entropy change
∆Stot(px) for the process will be given by
∆Stot(px) = Sout(L(x))− Sin(x) +
∆Q(px)
T
≥ 0. (6)
This particular process will be thermodynamically reversible if ∆Stot(px) = 0.
Note that in the commonly considered case in which the initial and final en-
tropies of the system are the same, ∆Stot is proportional to the heat flow from
the system into the reservoir. Furthermore if the initial and final energies of
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the system are the same as well, then from the first law of thermodynamics,
this heat flow is equal to the work done on the system.
We say that the L-machine is thermodynamically reversible if and only if
∀x ∈ X,∆Stot(px) = 0 (i.e. if all of the processes px are thermodynamically
reversible). An L-machine is therefore thermodynamically irreversible if there
exists an x ∈ X for which ∆Stot(px) > 0.
Note that we rule out implementing L by implementing some other ‘stronger’
L′ from which the outputs of L can be deduced; for example, the logical trans-
formation L′ corresponding to the combination of L and keeping a copy of the
input. Formally, we say that a logical transformation L′ is stronger than a
logical transformation L just in case, for every input x, L(x) can be recovered
from L′(x), but for at least one x, L′(x) cannot be recovered from L(x). It fol-
lows that if L′ is stronger than L, then, for every x, L(x) = L∗(L′(x)), where
L∗ is a logically irreversible transformation6. In general an implementation of
a logically stronger L′ is not an implementation of L, and is unfaithful in the
following sense: it allows that, for some x, we can learn more about the value
of x from the output L′(x) than from L(x) itself. Allowing that L can be
implemented by the implementation of a logically stronger transformation L′
must also be ruled out because it begs the question at issue here by implicitly
assuming that Landauer’s Principle is false: we could always implement a
logically irreversible process by implementing a stronger logically reversible
process, and all sides agree that this could be done in a thermodynamically
reversible way.
Note also that in the above definition we assign a unique representative
state to each logical state as this makes for a clear and simple analysis in
what follows. However, in general it could be allowed that more than one
physical state represents the same logical state, in which case, for each x,
Din(x) would be replaced by a set {D
(1)
in (x), D
(2)
in (x) . . .} of distinct physical
6Note that L′(x) can itself be logically irreversible, such as the logical transformation
L
′ corresponding to the combination of LAND and keeping a copy of the second input bit.
L
′ is stronger than LAND but is still logically irreversible.
11
states (and similarly for each y). We could call such a generalisation a ‘multi-
L-machine’. The condition (5) on the time-evolution operator of the device
would then generalise in an obvious way to
∀x ∈ X,∀D
(i)
in (x),∃D
(j)
out(L(x)) : ΛL(D
(i)
in (x)) = D
(j)
out(L(x)). (7)
By definition, each representative state is a physically distinguishable
macrostate, so we assume that we can prepare the device in a specific D
(i)
in (x),
and tell which of the D
(j)
out(y) it ends up in. Hence, we can define a refinement
of any multi-L-machine, as the multi-L-machine we get by choosing a partic-
ular representative state for each logical input state, and their corresponding
output states, and keeping the device and time evolution operator the same.
For many multi-L-machines, every refinement is an L-machine and in
such cases we gain nothing by considering the generalisation. However, in
every other case there exists a refinement which under relabelling of its out-
put states is an L′-machine, for some L′ that is logically stronger than L.
This is unfaithful in the sense defined above, and hence we rule out such
cases. Furthermore, without ruling out these cases then, for any logically
irreversible L, we could consider a machine that implements L merely in
virtue of the fact that it is stipulated that for every logical input state x, the
same physical state represents x and L(x), where the time evolution operator
is the identity operator. This clearly trivialises the notion of implementing
a logical transformation. It is ruled out by our prescription above since it
could be used to implement the logically stronger identity operation.
5 Proof of Landauer’s Principle using a ther-
modynamic cycle
Application of the statement of the second law in terms of entropy is contro-
versial for many reasons. In particular, because of concerns about the status
of the thermodynamic entropy as an objective property of physical systems
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given its connection to concepts such as uncertainty, probability and so on,
and furthermore, because such applications often proceed via information
theoretic definitions of entropy. In this section we offer a proof of our main
result which appeals only to the more concrete statement of the second law
of thermodynamics which is usually referred to as the Kelvin formulation:
“It is impossible to perform a cyclic process with no other re-
sult than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir, and work is
performed.” (Uffink 2001, p. 328)
Consider an L-machine which implements an irreversible logical transfor-
mation L. As L is logically irreversible, it is not a one-to-one mapping. It is
therefore possible to select two logical input states (x1, x2) ∈ X which map
onto the same logical output state y ∈ Y (such that L(x1) = L(x2) = y).
Now consider a composite system SDB, consisting of the device D (pre-
pared in the output state Dout(y)) and a box B containing a single gas
molecule trapped between two pistons, in a heat reservoir at temperature T
(see figure 2).
We investigate the average heat flow from the composite system SDB into
the heat reservoir during the following 4-stage cyclic process PDB (note that
whenever heat flows from the reservoir ∆Q is negative):
1. Insert a partition into the box B (parallel to the two pistons), such
that there is a probability q1 (0 < q1 < 1) of the particle being confined
to the left of the partition, and a probability q2 = 1 − q1 of it being
confined to the right of the partition.
2. Perform a controlled operation on the device D, which depends on the
position of the particle in the box B, such that
(a) If the particle is to the left of the partition, the device is trans-
formed thermodynamically reversibly from the stateDout(y) to the
state Din(x1), causing a heat flow ∆QD1 = T (Sout(y) − Sin(x1))
into the heat reservoir.
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(b) If the particle is to the right of the partition, the device is trans-
formed thermodynamically reversibly from the stateDout(y) to the
state Din(x2), causing a heat flow ∆QD2 = T (Sout(y) − Sin(x2))
into the heat reservoir.
3. Perform a controlled operation on the box B, which depends on the
state of the device D, such that
(a) If the device is in state Din(x1), the right-hand piston is moved up
to the partition, then the partition is removed, and the gas particle
is allowed to expand isothermally against the piston (performing
work −kT ln q1, and causing heat to flow from the reservoir so
that ∆QB1 = kT ln q1) until the piston is returned to its initial
position.
(b) If the device is in state Din(x2), the left-hand piston is moved up
to the partition, then the partition is removed, and the gas particle
is allowed to expand isothermally against the piston (performing
work −kT ln q2, and causing heat to flow from the reservoir so
that ∆QB2 = kT ln q2) until the piston is returned to its initial
position.
4. Activate the L-machine (by pressing the ‘go’ button), so that the device
D undergoes the evolution ΛL, such that
(a) If the device is in the state Din(x1), the process px1 occurs and
transforms the state of the device into Dout(y), causing a heat flow
∆Q(px1) into the reservoir.
(b) If the device is in the state Din(x2), the process px2 occurs and
transforms the state of the device into Dout(y), causing a heat flow
∆Q(px2) into the reservoir.
Note that the device D is analogous to the memory of the familiar kind
of Maxwell’s demon inspired by the engine described in Szilard (1929) and
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Figure 2: The evolution of the system SDB
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analysed in Bennett (1987): step 2 corresponds to the demon measuring
the position of the particle; step 3 is the demon extracting work from the
gas; and step 4 is the demon resetting its memory. We assume that the
controlled operations in steps 2 and 3 can be performed thermodynamically
reversibly, because each of them corresponds to a logically reversible trans-
formation (namely ’copy’ and ’uncopy’ respectively). Note that the first
of these is a measurement. Brillouin (1951) influentially claimed that all
measurements involve the generation of heat, and are thermodynamically
irreversible. However, Bennett (1987) showed that measurements can in
principle be performed in a thermodynamically reversible way.
After steps 1-4 of the cycle, the combined system SDB will have returned
to its initial state. The average heat flow into the heat reservoir during one
complete cycle pDB is obtained by summing the average heat flow in step 2
(∆QDn), step 3 (∆QBn) and step 4 (∆Q(pxn)):
〈∆Q(pDB)〉 =
∑
n=1,2
qn(∆QDn +∆QBn +∆Q(pxn)) (8)
=
∑
n=1,2
qn(T (Sout(y)− Sin(xn)) + kT ln qn +∆Q(pxn)) (9)
=
∑
n=1,2
qn(T∆Stot(pxn) + kT ln qn), (10)
where we have used equation (6) to obtain the final line. As the process is
cyclic, the internal energy of the initial and final states of the entire system
is the same. Hence, from the first law of thermodynamics, if the heat flow is
negative (i.e. heat flows from the reservoir into the system), then that heat
must have been converted into work by the system. Clearly, by performing
this cycle many times we could obtain a well-defined heat flow proportional
to the average heat flow in a single cycle. In order to satisfy the Kelvin
statement of the second law above we must therefore have:
〈∆Q(pDB)〉 ≥ 0. (11)
16
and hence ∑
n=1,2
qn∆Stot(pxn) ≥ −k
∑
n=1,2
(qn ln qn) > 0. (12)
As
∑
n=1,2 qn∆Stot(pxn) > 0, one or both of ∆Stot(px1) or ∆Stot(px2) must
be greater than 0. Following the definition in the previous section, this
proves:
Theorem: If L is logically irreversible, then every L-machine is
thermodynamically irreversible.
In fact, by considering specific initial states, it is possible to prove that
both ∆Stot(px1) > 0 and ∆Stot(px2) > 0.
For any non-zero value of ∆Stot(px1), consider the case in which q1 =
exp(−∆Stot(px1)/k). Inserting this into the above equation we find that
∆Stot(px2) ≥ −k ln(1− q1) > 0. (13)
Hence if ∆Stot(px1) > 0, it must also be true that ∆Stot(px2) > 0. Similarly,
we can show that if ∆Stot(px2) > 0 then ∆Stot(px1) > 0. As one of the
entropy changes must be greater than zero in order to satisfy (12), the other
entropy change must also be greater than zero.
The process px of operating the L-machine with input state Din(x) will
therefore be thermodynamically irreversible for each logical input state x
which cannot be deduced unambiguously from its logical output state y =
L(x).
Furthermore, if the total entropy change for each process is bounded
above by a large but finite amount ∆Smaxtot (as it must be in any realistic
scenario), then the minimum entropy change of each irreversible process is
bounded below by a corresponding small but finite amount ∆Smintot , where,
∆Smintot = −k ln
(
1− exp
(
−∆Smaxtot
k
))
. (14)
We show in appendix A that this is the tightest lower bound. Note that
as ∆Smaxtot decreases, ∆S
min
tot increases. The lowest possible value for ∆S
max
tot is
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therefore achieved when ∆Smaxtot = ∆S
min
tot (because ∆S
max
tot < ∆S
min
tot cannot
be satisfied). From equation (14) this occurs when ∆Smaxtot = ∆S
min
tot = k ln 2.
Note also that when q1 = q2 = 1/2, equation (12) implies that (∆Stot(px1) +
∆Stot(px2))/2 ≥ k ln 2. In the standard case in which the entropies of the
input and output representative states are equal, ∆Stot(pxn) = ∆Q(pxn)/T .
We therefore make contact with the standard quantitative formulation of
Landauer’s Principle according to which resetting one bit of information re-
quires an average heat flow of at least kT ln 2. We must emphasise that for
an individual process (for example, the process whereby a ’1’ is reset to a ’0’),
the heat flow may be less than kT ln 2, and thus it is only the average heat
flow that satisfies the quantitative form of Landauer’s Principle (and then
only when q1 = q2 = 1/2). (Note however, that equation (12) is completely
general.)
The above theorem depends on the application of thermodynamics to a
family of processes rather than just to one or another of them. It is trivially
true that any individual process in the family of processes that implement a
logical transformation can be carried out in a thermodynamically reversible
way. To see this, consider the transformation of an arbitrary logical input
state, x, into an arbitrary logical output state, y. Then choose an arbitrary
thermodynamically reversible process and stipulate that its initial state rep-
resents x and its final state represents y. This may seem like cheating, but
without the requirement that we consider a device which is guaranteed to
implement a logical transformation for multiple input states, there is no ther-
modynamic constraint.
6 A simple example: Reset
As an example of the above, consider the logical transformation ‘Reset’ rep-
resented by the truth table
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Input Output
0 0
1 0
The logical transformation ‘Reset’ represents the simplest logically irre-
versible transformation. Defining the input states x1=‘0’ and x2=‘1’, and
the output states y1=‘0’ and y2=‘1’, the map LReset : X → Y corresponding
to the Reset operation is given by
LReset(x1) = LReset(x2) = y1. (15)
Landauer’s Principle is often stated in terms of ’erasure’. However, ‘era-
sure’ might be taken to refer either to ‘Reset’ or to any other transformation
where the output is independent of the input (including probabilistic transfor-
mations sometimes referred to as ‘randomising data’). ‘Erasure’ is therefore
a potentially confusing term and is not always clearly defined in the litera-
ture: for example Leff and Rex (1990), pp. 22-25, refer to ‘erasure/resetting’.
Here we are concerned with the Reset operation, LReset, because it is an ir-
reversible logical operation, which maps logical states to logical states. On
the other hand, Maroney (2005) considers the probabilistic transformation
‘RAND’ which outputs 0 or 1 each with 50% probability independently of
the input. In accordance with standard assumptions, this is not a logical
operation according to our definition. Thus, ‘RAND’ is not in the scope of
the present article. We note that, as ‘Reset’ is a logical operation, ‘Reset’
and not ‘RAND’ is normally used in practical computation. Maroney argues
that it is ‘unnecessarily restrictive’ to ignore such ‘non-deterministic oper-
ations’. We agree that it is interesting to consider these; however in this
paper we are addressing the question of whether Landauer’s Principle is true
when we do restrict ourselves to deterministic operations. Furthermore, we
conjecture that an extension of our approach to probabilistic transformations
will recover the appropriate analogue of Landauer’s Principle.
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It is clear that every logically irreversible transformation is equivalent to
a logically reversible transformation plus one or more Reset operations. To
see this consider an arbitrary logically irreversible transformation. It can
be converted into a reversible transformation if a copy of the input state is
appended to its output. This clearly allows the input state to be recovered
from the output state. To obtain a transformation logically equivalent to the
original irreversible transformation we simply reset the copy.
Note also that in the proofs above, the only step which incorporates the
irreversibility of the logical transformation L is that in which L is represented
as having inputs x1 and x2 and an output y such that L(x1) = L(x2) = y,
which is just how we characterised Reset above. We therefore explicitly made
use of the fact that every irreversible transformation incorporates Reset.
A common choice of physical device D to implement LReset, considered
by other authors and first introduced by Szilard, is the box B (of section 5)
containing a single gas molecule and a moveable partition, in a heat reservoir
at temperature T . We define the input and output states as follows:
Din(x1) = Dout(y1) =
Partition in the middle of the box,
and particle on the left.
(16)
Din(x2) = Dout(y2) =
Partition in the middle of the box,
and particle on the right.
(17)
The entropy of the system in all these states is the same.
One way to implement LReset using this box is to perform the following
procedure ΛLReset :
1. Remove the central partition
2. Isothermally compress the gas into the left hand half of the box using
a piston. This requires work kT ln2 and causes heat flow ∆Q = kT ln 2
into the heat reservoir.
3. Replace the central partition
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4. Withdraw the piston (to the right)
With this procedure we have
∆Stot(px1) = ∆Stot(px2) =
∆Q
T
= k ln 2 (18)
and hence resetting either initial state is a thermodynamically irreversible
process, and the LReset-machine {D, {Din(x)|x ∈ X} , {Dout(y)|y ∈ Y } ,ΛLReset}
is thermodynamically irreversible.
Note that by modifying the procedure carried out by the device, it is
possible to obtain arbitrarily small (non-zero) values of ∆Stot(px1). However
∆Stot(px2) must then become arbitrarily large to compensate (see the dis-
cussion of bounds at the end of section 5 and in Appendix A). One possible
scheme is the following
1. Isothermally compress the gas in the right-hand half of the box into
the fraction v of its initial volume nearest the partition, using a pis-
ton. If the particle is initially in the right-hand side of the box, this
requires work −kT ln(v) and causes a heat flow ∆Q = −kT ln(v) into
the reservoir.
2. Remove the central partition
3. Isothermally compress the gas into the left hand half of the box by fur-
ther moving the piston. This requires work kT ln(1+ v) and dissipates
heat ∆Q = kT ln(1 + v) into the reservoir.
4. Replace the central partition
5. Withdraw the piston (to the right)
This gives ∆Stot(px1) = k ln(1 + v) < k ln 2 and ∆Stot(px2) = k ln(1 + 1/v) >
k ln 2.
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7 Known and unknown data
As stated in Section 4, we stipulate that everything accessible to the device
throughout a computation is contained within it; nothing else is allowed to
influence its evolution. Clearly then if an operator was allowed to input
further data in the middle of a computation then we must regard them as
part of the device. In the light of this it is important to be clear about what
is meant by the notions of known and unknown data. First note that in
practice data is always about some target system; however, what is relevant
to computation is only what is accessible to the computational device. Hence,
when we refer to known and unknown data this must be understood in terms
of what is ‘known’ by the device. Consider a computational device D that
contains a register R, and a memory M which can be read. Both R and
M have representative states, and we assume without loss of generality that
they have the same number of them.
We define what it is for the register R to contain known or unknown data
as follows:
1. Known data: The representative state of the register R and the rep-
resentative state of the memory M both represent the same logical
state.
2. Unknown data: The representative state of the register R and the
representative state of the memory M need not both represent the
same logical state.
Now suppose that we wish to implement the logical transformation L on
the register R, whilst keeping the state of the memory M unchanged. As an
example, let L = LReset as defined in section 6. Then we can define the global
operation on the register and the memory respectively as L′ = LReset × I,
where I is the identity operation.
L′ can be represented by the following truth-table:
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RM RM
00 00
01 01
10 00
11 01
As L′ is logically irreversible, by our Theorem, any L′-machine is ther-
modynamically irreversible.
However, in the case of known data the Reset operation on R can be
implemented by the global operation LUncopy which is given by the following
truth-table:
RM RM
00 00
01 11
10 10
11 01
This is because the middle two lines where LUncopy differs from L
′ are
guaranteed not to occur for known data. However, note that LUncopy is logi-
cally reversible and therefore it is possible to implement it thermodynamically
reversibly7.
In the light of what we say in section 6 about the relationship between
logically irreversible transformations and Reset, this result generalises imme-
diately to the result that there are no irreversible logical transformations on
known data, provided the memory is not changed by the transformation (c.f.
Bennett (2003)).
7Norton (2005), p.404 proposes a ’no-erasure demon’ but his system does not really
achieve the implementation of a logically irreversible process because, since since the same
bit cannot be both the control and the target of a controlled operation, the system must
have a ’memory’ (our M) of which program it has run, which amounts to the system
keeping a copy of the original bit; hence, in our terminology it implements LUncopy.
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8 Proof of Landauer’s Principle using infor-
mation theoretic entropies
In this section, as is becoming common, we make use of information theoretic
entropies to derive the main result. This section offers an alternative proof of
Landauer’s Principle, but our previous proof in no way depends upon it or on
information theory. We note that there is a good deal of controversy about
the relationship between information theory and thermodynamics. We can-
not resolve this controversy in this paper; however, we offer the proof below
because it seems to us suggestive that the information theoretic reasoning
we use recovers the same qualitative and quantitative results as our earlier
proof in terms of phenomenological thermodynamics. We hope that similar
attempts to operationalise information theoretic reasoning to connect it with
phenomenological thermodynamics will contribute to the clarification of the
status of information theory.
Previous arguments in the literature are usually restricted to specific ex-
amples of L-machines, from which the authors generalise without rigorous
proof. For those readers, such as John Norton, who are dubious about this
latter aspect of defences of Landauer’s Principle, we offer here a general ar-
gument, stating explicitly the reasoning which may have been implicit in
previous work. Norton also raises concerns about the use of information the-
oretic entropies in conjunction with thermodynamic results in this context.
At the end of this section we respond to some of Norton’s concerns.
If the different microstates of a system are discrete (as for example with
energy eigenstates in quantum theories) and occupied with probability λn,
we define the (information theoretic) entropy of that system by
S = −k
∑
n
λn lnλn. (19)
Note that this coincides with the thermodynamic entropy when the system
has a canonical probability distribution, and that it differs from the standard
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information-theoretic entropy by a normalisation factor of k ln 2. Note also
that we assume that the total change in the information theoretic entropy
is never negative, in other words that the entropic statement of the second
law of thermodynamics also applies to information theoretic entropy (see
Appendix B).
As before, consider an L-machine which implements an irreversible logical
transformation L, and two logical input states (x1, x2) ∈ X which map onto
the same logical output state y ∈ Y (such that L(x1) = L(x2) = y).
Now consider the following process pm(q1): Prepare the device D in the
state D
m(q1)
in which is a mixture of the states Din(x1) and Din(x2) with proba-
bilities q1 and q2 = (1− q1) respectively, and evolve it using ΛL. This process
yields the final state Dout(y) with certainty.
Recall that pm(q1) is not one of the family of processes that implement L,
because D
m(q1)
in is not a representative state, and therefore p
m(q1) /∈ {px|x ∈
X}. Once again, the fundamental difference between our approach and that
of Maroney (2005) is that he isn’t sensitive to these distinctions.
However, we can use the process pm(q1) to prove a result for px1 and px2 .
Using the definition of the information-theoretic entropy given by (19), the
entropy of the device in the physical state D
m(q1)
in can be shown to be (e.g.
Jones 1979)
S
m(q1)
in =
∑
n=1,2
qnSin(xn)− k
∑
n=1,2
qn ln qn. (20)
Hence the entropy change of the device when it is evolved using ΛL is
∆Ssys(p
m(q1)) = Sout(y)−
∑
n=1,2
qn(Sin(xn)− k ln qn) (21)
The entropy change of the heat reservoir during the process is given by
∆Sres(p
m) =
∑
n=1,2
qn
(
∆Q(pxn)
T
)
. (22)
The total entropy change during the process pm(q1) is therefore
∆Stot(p
m) =
∑
n=1,2
qn
(
Sout(y)− Sin(xn) + k ln qn +
∆Q(pxn)
T
)
≥ 0. (23)
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Using the definition of ∆Stot(pxn) given in equation (6), this implies that∑
n=1,2
qn∆Stot(pxn) ≥ −k
∑
n=1,2
qn ln qn > 0. (24)
This is the same result that we obtained in equation (12) in section 5 from
which can be derived the results concerning bounds, and our Theorem: If
L is logically irreversible, then every L-machine is thermodynamically irre-
versible.
If we consider the example of an LReset-machine introduced in Section 6
we can use the information theoretic entropy to analyse the process pm(1/2)
in which the device is prepared in the thermodynamic state D
m(1/2)
in , which
is not a representative state but rather an equal probabilistic mixture of
Din(x1) and Din(x2), and then evolved (as in Maroney 2005). We have
∆Stot(p
m(1/2)) = 0, and hence this particular process pm(1/2) is thermody-
namically reversible. Indeed, we can see that the reverse procedure Λ′LReset
described thus:
1. Move the piston into the centre of the box (from the right)
2. Remove the central partition
3. Allow the gas to expand isothermally into the right-hand half of the
box by pushing against the piston. During this process, we can extract
work kT ln 2 from the gas, causing heat to flow from the reservoir so
that ∆Q = −kT ln 2.
4. Replace the central partition
will take the final state Dout(y1) back onto an initial state D
m(1/2)
in . However,
as D
m(1/2)
in is not a representative state, and p
m(1/2) is not one of the family
of processes that implement L, because pm(1/2) /∈ {px|x ∈ X}, this cannot
be considered an implementation of L. The fundamental difference between
our approach and that of Maroney (2005) is that he isn’t sensitive to these
distinctions. Furthermore, the evolution ΛLReset followed by Λ
′
LReset
will leave
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all input states in the final state D
m(1/2)
in , so clearly the system does not
always end up in the state in which it began.
In his criticism of the common approaches to this problem, Norton claims
that thermodynamics cannot be applied to states in general probabilistic
mixtures (such as the state D
m(q1)
in ), but only to those corresponding to a
canonical mixture in which the microstate n, with energy En, is occupied
with probability
λn =
1
Z
exp
(
−En
kT
)
(25)
where
Z =
∑
n
exp
(
−En
kT
)
(26)
is the partition function for the state.
However, given any two thermodynamic statesDin(x1) andDin(x2) which
are canonically distributed, it is always possible to construct a canonical
mixture by taking
q1 =
Z1
Z1 + Z2
q2 =
Z2
Z1 + Z2
, (27)
where Z1 and Z2 are the partition functions for states Din(x1) and Din(x2)
respectively. Considering the evolution of this canonical state is sufficient
to prove our main result, that one or both of ∆Stot(px1) or ∆Stot(px2) must
be greater than 0, and hence that the L-machine is thermodynamically irre-
versible. However, it is not sufficient to prove the stronger claim that both
px1 and px2 must be thermodynamically irreversible.
Norton (2005) also objects to assigning entropies to probabilistic mix-
tures of macrostates where the whole of the associated phase space is not
accessible to each microstate (e.g. a gas on either side of a partition). This
is a reasonable concern to raise, however, we anticipate that it will be pos-
sible to extend thermodynamics to probabilistic mixtures of macrostates in
a general way, and that the information theoretic entropy of the probability
distribution will be a natural component of the thermodynamic entropy of
the mixtures. Explicitly, we conjecture that the appropriate thermodynamic
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entropy Smixture of a mixture of distinct macrostates Mn with probability qn
is
Smixture =
∑
n
qnS(Mn)− k
∑
n
qn ln qn (28)
We note that it is highly suggestive that our information theoretic ap-
proach makes exact quantitative contact with the purely thermodynamic
reasoning we used in section 5 above.
9 Single-process irreversibility
In this section we also make use of information theory to obtain a corol-
lary to the results of the previous section. Although the thermodynamic
reversibility of a particular process pm(q1) is not indicative of whether an L-
machine is thermodynamically reversible or not (as discussed in section 8),
it is interesting to consider whether there exists any single process which is
thermodynamically irreversible if and only if the L-machine is.
In fact there is, but to express it we must consider not simply the deviceD,
but a source system A (external to the device) from which the initial state of
the L-machine is set. This is the way in which an L-machine would standardly
be used to perform a computation (because the results of a computation on
an initial state that wasn’t correlated with anything are of no interest).
Suppose that initially the source system A is in an equal probabilistic
mixture of its representative states {A(x)|x ∈ X} (representing uncertainty
in the initial data), and the device D is in the standard state Din(x1) (its
ready state). Now consider the following process pA(L):
1. Perform a controlled operation from A to D such that when A is in
the state A(x), the state Din(x1) is transformed thermodynamically
reversibly to the state Din(x). This corresponds to copying the initial
data from the source into the device.
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2. Perform the evolution ΛL of the L-machine. This corresponds to per-
forming the required computation.
By considering the information-theoretic entropies of the combined prob-
ability distribution for D and A, it is easily seen that
∆Stot(p
A(L)) =
1
|X|
∑
x
∆Stot(px), (29)
where |X| is the number of possible logical inputs.8.
Hence, ∆Stot(p
A(L)) > 0 (i.e. the process pA(L) will be thermodynamically
irreversible) if and only if at least one of the processes px is thermodynam-
ically irreversible. From our definition of the thermodynamic irreversibility
for an L-machine, it is clear that the process pA(L) will be thermodynamically
irreversible if and only if the L-machine involved in it is thermodynamically
irreversible.
To our Theorem, we can therefore add the following corollary: If L is
logically irreversible, then the process pA(L) will be thermodynamically irre-
versible.
10 Conclusions
We note the clarification that is achieved by carefully distinguishing between
logical and physical concepts, and between individual processes and fami-
lies of processes. The introduction of the conceptual tool of the L-machine,
and the definition of what it is for one to be thermodynamically irreversible
enables us to achieve generality without loss of precision. An L-machine
is thermodynamically irreversible if at least one of the processes px, corre-
sponding to activation of the device with the input state corresponding to x,
is thermodynamically irreversible. In particular, the process px will be ther-
8Note that A keeps a copy of the input, but it is not part of the L-machine we are
considering, and hence does not constitute a memory in the sense of Section 7
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modynamically irreversible whenever x cannot be unambiguously determined
from L(x).
Hence, we are able to prove the generalised qualitative form of Landauer’s
principle:
If L is logically irreversible, then every L-machine is thermody-
namically irreversible.
We also give quantitative bounds on this irreversibility compatible with the
quantitative form of Landauer’s Principle. This completes the sought after
connection between logical and thermodynamical irreversibility.
Our result follows either from analysis of the cycle introduced in Section
5, or from the information theoretic approach in Section 8. The latter is
more contentious foundationally and depends on the applicability of thermo-
dynamical reasoning to the information theoretic entropy and probabilistic
mixtures of macrostates. In the former proof, where we make operational
contact with the Kelvin statement of the second law of thermodynamics, we
must rely upon a number of (commonly accepted) assumptions about the
idealised physical systems we make use of in the cycle. In particular we as-
sume: the existence of a box B containing a single molecule and a partition,
and that the molecule can be treated thermodynamically as an ideal gas; the
existence of a heat bath; we assume that the (logically reversible) controlled
operations that couple the box B and the device D can be performed in a
thermodynamically reversible way; the applicability of the thermodynamic
entropy to well-defined (non-mixed) macrostates; and that the moving of
pistons and partitions can be done frictionlessly. Finally, we assume that the
second law of thermodynamics is true.
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Appendix A
In section 5, we showed that once ∆Stot(px1) is fixed, ∆Stot(px2) is bounded
from below by
∆Stot(px2) ≥ −k ln
(
1− exp
(
−∆Stot(px1)
k
))
. (30)
However, this bound was obtained by considering a specific initial setup,
in which q1 = exp(−∆Stot(px1)/k), and it is conceivable that a stronger
lower bound could be obtained by considering other values of q1 in the range
0 < q1 < 1. In this appendix, we prove that the above choice of q1 is optimal,
and that the bound given by (30) is the strongest lower bound on ∆Stot(px2)
that can be obtained.
From equation (12) the lower bound L(q1) on ∆S
LB
tot (px2) for a general q1
is given by
∆Stot(px2) ≥ L(q1) =
1
q2
(
−q1∆Stot(px1)− k
∑
n=1,2
qn ln qn
)
(31)
where q2 = 1− q1. Hence
L(q1) = −
q1
q2
(∆Stot(px1) + k ln q1)− k ln q2, (32)
dL(q1)
dq1
= −
1
q22
(∆Stot(px1) + k ln q1) , (33)
d2L(q1)
dq21
=
2
q2
dL(q1)
dq1
−
k
q1q22
. (34)
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As q1 > 0 and q2 > 0, the lower bound L(q1) has a unique extremal point,
which is a maximum, at
q1 = exp
(
−
∆Stot(px1)
k
)
. (35)
But this is just the value of q1 we originally selected, proving that the lower
bound being given by equation (30) is the strongest lower bound that can be
obtained.
Appendix B
Here we offer a general argument for applying the second law to a system in a
heat reservoir even when it does not have a canonical probability distribution
(such as in the process pm(q1) of section 6). We assume that it makes sense to
talk about the state of the universe and any subsystem of it in probabilistic
terms, but we remain neutral about whether such probabilities are epistemic
or ontic. We also assume for simplicity that all the relevant microstates are
discrete and hence that we can use the definition of the information theoretic
entropy in equation (19).
Suppose the universe consists of system, in which we are interested, and
everything else, which we treat as a heat reservoir. We define Suniverse as
the entropy of the probabilistic state of the universe. As for any composite
object, the entropy of the universe will in general be less than the sum of the
entropies of the system and the heat reservoir individually, due to correlations
between them. We therefore write
Suniverse = Ssys + Sres − I(sys,res) (36)
where I(sys,res) is a positive quantity (usually referred to as the mutual in-
formation) corresponding to the entropy associated with the correlations be-
tween system and reservoir.
As a simple example of this, consider an equal mixture of the states
‘0A0B’ and ‘1A1B’ of a bipartite binary system, which has SAB = SA = SB =
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I(A,B) = k ln 2.
For a general process p on a system in a reservoir, we have
∆Suniverse(p) = ∆Ssys(p) + ∆Sres(p)−∆I(sys,res)(p) (37)
We then make the following assumptions:
1. We assume that the underlying dynamics are reversible such that the
total entropy of the universe does not decrease over time.
I.e. ∀p,∆Suniverse(p) ≥ 0.
2. We assume that with respect to time scales that are sufficiently large,
the correlations between the system and the heat reservoir increase or
are constant, that is, that ∀p,∆I(sys,res)(p) ≥ 0. This encapsulates the
fact that it is very hard to undo correlations made with a large thermal
environment, as the necessary information disperses away rapidly into
many degrees of freedom.
Using these assumptions we can recover a statement of the second law
applicable to general information-theoretic entropies:
∀ p, ∆Stot = ∆Ssys +∆Sres ≥ 0 (38)
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